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Abstract: Emotions encompass cognitive and behavioural responses to reward and 15 
punishment. Using contests as a case-study, we propose that short-term emotions underpin 16 
animals’ assessments, decision-making, and behaviour. Equating contest assessments to 17 
emotional “appraisals”, we describe how contestants appraise more than resource value and 18 
outcome probability. These appraisals elicit the cognition, drive, and neurophysiology that 19 
governs aggressive behaviour. We discuss how recent contest outcomes induce longer-term 20 
moods, which impact subsequent contest behaviour. Finally, we distinguish between integral 21 
(objectively relevant) and incidental (objectively irrelevant) emotions and moods (“affective 22 
states”). Unlike existing ecological models, our approach predicts that incidental events 23 
influence contest dynamics, and that contests become incidental influences themselves, 24 
potentially causing maladaptive decision-making. As affective states cross contexts, a more 25 
holistic ethology (incorporating emotions and moods) would illuminate animal cognition and 26 
behaviour. 27 
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1. Introduction 32 
Consider this: animal behaviour is underpinned by emotions and moods (“affective states”; 33 
see [1–11]). We define emotions as short-term states elicited by stimuli (or their predictors) 34 
that animals will work to acquire (rewards; e.g. prey) or avoid (punishments; e.g. predators 35 
[5,12,13]). Moods are longer-term states, which represent the cumulative average of emotions 36 
over time [14,15]. These functional definitions apply to any organism with a central nervous 37 
system [1]. Animal welfare scientists, neuroscientists, and psychopharmacologists now 38 
recognise that affective states play a key role in decision-making [6,7]. However, behavioural 39 
ecologists and fundamental ethologists have not yet embraced emotions and moods [16]. 40 
Two main dimensions characterise affective states: valence and arousal [6,17–19] (Figure 1). 41 
Valence, which ranges from positive to negative, encapsulates the fitness benefits and costs 42 
associated with a stimulus, either anticipated or actual [7]. Meanwhile, arousal (emotional 43 
intensity) indicates stimulus importance or urgency. High-arousal affective states divert 44 
attentional resources to the stimulus [20] and predispose vigorous action [21]. As well as 45 
emotions and moods, valence and arousal define sensations (e.g. pain) and interoception 46 
(which internal stimuli elicit; e.g. hunger [10]). Burgdorf and Panksepp [22] hypothesised 47 
that positive-valence, high-arousal states represent the activation of a reward acquisition 48 
system, whereas negative-valence, high-arousal states represent the activation of a 49 
punishment avoidance system. By conceptualising affective states in terms of reward and 50 
punishment, this dimensional approach captures their evolutionary function and avoids 51 
categorical labels that can lead to anthropomorphism (e.g. [8]). 52 
Figure 1. Valence and arousal define affective states (grey box), which encompasses 53 
emotions and moods [6]. Moving from Q3-Q1 is increasingly appetitive; Q2-Q4 is 54 
increasingly aversive. 55 
Anderson and Adolphs [1] identified two further characteristics of affective states. As well as 56 
having valence and arousal (“scalability”), emotions “generalise”: various stimuli and 57 
situations can induce a particular affective state, and affective states can be associated with 58 
various behavioural responses. Affective states also “persist” after stimulus removal. Thus, 59 
emotions do not mediate fixed responses to specific stimuli, because fixed responses neither 60 
generalise nor persist. Examples of non-affective behaviours, therefore, include withdrawal 61 




during development and subsequently invariant). Emotions, on the other hand, facilitate 63 
flexible behaviour in complex, variable environments [23]. 64 
We propose that animal contests are an example of affective behaviour. Contests are direct 65 
inter-individual interactions that determine access to resources, such as food, mates or 66 
territory (i.e. rewards [24]). Resource value (RV) is the fitness benefit of the resource [25]. 67 
Contest costs include energy and time expenditure, injury, and even death (i.e. punishments 68 
[26]). Greater potential benefits justify greater costs, so increasing RV increases investment 69 
[27,28]. However, contest costs and outcomes are not fixed. Resource-holding potential 70 
(RHP) is the ability to win contests, comprising traits like size, skill, and weaponry [29–31]. 71 
Animals with a higher RHP are better at winning, so they are more likely to gain resources. 72 
Contests involve acquiring resources and avoiding punishments (valence), vary in intensity 73 
and escalation (arousal), are elicited by diverse stimuli and exhibited in various ways 74 
(generalisation), and continue after the inciting event (persistence). These features imply an 75 
internal (i.e. affective) state mediating the link between reward, punishment, and contest 76 
behaviour. 77 
Previous researchers have not comprehensively applied affective state theory to animal 78 
contests. However, conceptualised as responses to rewards, punishments, and their predictors, 79 
emotions cover contest information-gathering, decision-making, and behaviour. This novel 80 
approach extends and refines contest motivation models. For example, Elwood and Arnott 81 
[32] explained contest dynamics in terms of two dimensions: RV and costs. A contestant 82 
engages if RV exceeds costs and withdraws if costs exceed RV. Whereas RV usually remains 83 
stable, costs accumulate throughout the contest. If costs increase enough to exceed RV, a 84 
contestant’s strategy switches from engage to withdraw. This model approximates the 85 
valence dimension of affective states – RV representing positive valence and costs 86 
representing negative valence – except that valence is not specific to contests [6,7,14,15]. 87 
In this review, we use contests as a case-study for applying emotion theory to behavioural 88 
ecology and fundamental ethology. We argue that contestants evaluate contest benefits and 89 
costs, and that these “appraisals” elicit emotional episodes encompassing contest decisions 90 
and behaviour. We describe how the affective outcome of contests might produce experience 91 
effects: prior winners’ tendency to initiate and win (and prior losers’ tendency to avoid and 92 
lose) subsequent contests. Unlike traditional ecological models, our perspective predicts that 93 




dynamics. These objectively irrelevant influences could mediate contest decisions and cause 95 
maladaptive behaviour. 96 
2. Structure of Emotions 97 
Emotions are elicited by appraisals: evaluations of stimuli, their context, and their personal 98 
significance [33]. Scherer [34] proposed that humans sequentially appraise stimulus novelty, 99 
intrinsic valence, congruence with personal goals, outcome probability, discrepancy from 100 
expectations, situation controllability, other individuals’ responsibility, and whether potential 101 
responses are socially acceptable. Appraisal outcomes determine and differentiate emotions 102 
[35], with continuously-updated re-appraisals regulating the response [36]. Other mammals, 103 
birds, and fish also appear to appraise stimuli [23]. In lambs (Ovis aries), for example, 104 
stimulus novelty, discrepancy from expectations, controllability, and social context impact 105 
physiology and behaviour [37]. These inferred appraisals elicit flexible emotional responses, 106 
which account for current conditions and personal circumstances, as well as intrinsic stimulus 107 
characteristics. 108 
Emotions have multiple components that can be measured empirically [10,38] (Figure 2). 109 
These include changes in (1) cognition: information-gathering and processing; (2) drive: 110 
manifested as the work animals will invest to access reward or avoid punishment; and (3) 111 
neurophysiology: central and peripheral nervous system activity, and neuroendocrine 112 
function. Such changes facilitate the performance of (4) behaviour, producing an organism-113 
level response to reward and punishment [5,39,40]. Threatening stimuli, for instance, impact 114 
(1) cognition: increasing attention to the threat; (2) drive: maximising the work animals will 115 
invest in performing freeze, fight, or flight responses; and (3) neurophysiology: activating 116 
both the sympathetic nervous system and hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. These changes 117 
prepare the individual for (4) behaviour: avoiding, attacking or escaping the threat. 118 
Figure 2. An emotional episode (white box). Appraisals of stimuli, their context, and their 119 
personal significance elicit the emotion (grey box), whose components include cognition, 120 
drive, and neurophysiology. These components govern the expression of behaviour. 121 
Conscious “feelings” (not shown) are another potential component, but not essential. 122 
Conscious feelings, another potential emotion component, cannot be directly measured. 123 




researchers usually study other emotion components and remain agnostic about feelings 125 
[4,9,10]. Indeed, many human psychologists recognise unconscious emotion, where the 126 
measurable components occur without corresponding feelings [41]. For example, 127 
Winkielman et al. [42] showed people positive or negative facial expressions. The images 128 
appeared too briefly for conscious awareness. When subsequently offered a novel drink, 129 
subjects shown the positive expression poured more, drank more, and paid more than subjects 130 
shown the negative expression. Self-reported affective states did not differ between 131 
treatments. In animals, the relationship between feeling and non-feeling emotion components 132 
is an important area for future research [43]. However, for present purposes, we view 133 
emotions as functional states that may or may not be accompanied by feelings. 134 
 135 
Animal welfare scientists and psychopharmacologists investigate affective states through 136 
both experiment and observation. In emotion induction experiments, rewards (e.g. enrichment 137 
[44]) induce positive emotions, and punishments (e.g. social defeat [45]) induce negative 138 
emotions [13]. Pharmacological manipulations may also induce positive- and negative-139 
valence states [46]. Observationally, the measurable components of an emotional episode can 140 
indicate valence [4]. This includes changes in (1) cognition: attention [47], judgement 141 
[48,49], and memory biases [50]; (2) drive: the work animals will invest to access reward or 142 
avoid punishment [51,52]; (3) neurophysiology: brain and neuroendocrine circuits [5,8], and 143 
peripheral nervous system activity [2]; and (4) behaviour: approach, exploration, and play are 144 
often positively valenced, whereas avoidance and hiding are often negatively valenced [2]. 145 
Detailed discussion of empirical methods is beyond our scope, but we direct readers to 146 
previous reviews on measuring affective states in animals [2,4,6–8,10,11,47–49,51,52]. 147 
3. Initiating, Escalating, and Quitting Contests 148 
Contest theorists emphasise two key assessments: animals assess RV (which determines 149 
fitness benefits and motivation) and RHP (which predicts fitness costs and outcome 150 
likelihood [25,29]). Contestants may assess only their own RHP (self-assessment [53,54]) or 151 
compare their RHP to their opponent’s (mutual assessment [26,28,55]). In a meta-analysis of 152 
36 species’ assessment strategies, Pinto et al. [56] found that self-assessment is more 153 




Appraisal theory articulates and extends contest theory. The former predicts broader 155 
evaluations of the resource, opponent, and context, all related back to the individual’s own 156 
goals. Under Scherer’s [34] sequential theory, contestants would first appraise novelty. 157 
Familiar resources are valued above novel resources (e.g. residency effects [57,58]), whilst 158 
dominance hierarchies reduce aggression towards familiar rivals [59]. Second, contestants 159 
would appraise the resource’s intrinsic valence (objective RV; e.g. the calories in food). 160 
Third, contestants would appraise whether the resource contributes to their goals (subjective 161 
RV; e.g. starving animals value food most [60]). Fourth, contestants would appraise outcome 162 
probability (which covers RHP assessments). Animals avoid or de-escalate contests they will 163 
probably lose [29]. Fifth, contestants would appraise discrepancy from expectations. 164 
Compared to unconditioned controls, animals trained that a stimulus signals reward become 165 
more aggressive when the stimulus is unrewarded [61–63]. Sixth, contestants would appraise 166 
their response’s compatibility with social context. Observer presence can modify animals’ 167 
behaviour (audience effects [64–66]) and watching contests can modify the observers’ 168 
subsequent behaviour (bystander effects [64,67]). During ongoing contests, animals also 169 
reappraise assessments, adjusting their behaviour as information and costs accumulate 170 
[31,55]. These appraisals have all been empirically documented, but several are not 171 
incorporated into current contest theory. 172 
 173 
We further postulate that appraisals unify reward and punishment inputs into a decision-174 
making common currency [68,69]. This facilitates cross-context comparisons between 175 
competing emotions, moods, sensations, and interoception. For instance, food-deprived 176 
goldfish (Carassius auratus) endure more electric shocks to feed than well-fed goldfish [60]. 177 
Following shocks, fewer hermit crabs (Pagurus bernhardus) evacuate preferred Littorina 178 
shells than non-preferred Gibbula shells [70]. We conceptualise valence as the common 179 
currency in these reward/punishment trade-offs. Contestants likewise weigh RV against 180 
potential contest costs and outcome likelihood [32]. In self-assessment, contestants’ affective 181 
states integrate RV and own RHP information. Animals persist until they reach a negative-182 
valence threshold: the maximum cost they will pay for the resource. This threshold may be 183 
energetic [71,72] or include injury costs as well [73]. In mutual assessment, affective states 184 
integrate RV, own RHP, and opponent RHP information. Animals withdraw when they 185 
establish that their opponent has a higher RHP [55], perhaps when they tip below neutral 186 
valence. Both self- and mutual assessment models require unidimensional (valence) 187 





Affective states may also determine assessment strategy. Researchers traditionally viewed 190 
assessment strategies as fixed (e.g. [29,32,74]), but now recognise individual- and 191 
population-level variation [75–77]. For example, green anoles (Anolis carolinensis) [78], 192 
mangrove killifish (Kryptolebias marmoratus) [79], and fiddler crabs (Uca mjoebergi) [80] 193 
use mutual assessment when deciding whether to escalate a contest, and self-assessment 194 
during the fight. Humans in positive affective states rely on heuristics (i.e. rules of thumb) 195 
more than humans in negative affective states [81]. When assessing the strength of an 196 
argument, for instance, people experiencing positive emotions use the author’s expertise, 197 
whereas people in neutral states judge the content (i.e. deeper processing [82,83]). In animal 198 
contests, positive valence may also promote less cognitively demanding assessment 199 
strategies, such as self-assessment or rules of thumb (e.g. “resident wins”; see [84]). Future 200 
research could manipulate affective states to test this. We hypothesise that prior reward will 201 
lead to self-assessment, whereas prior punishment will lead to mutual assessment. 202 
Having defined emotions as functional responses to reward and punishment, we can say that 203 
contest assessments (i.e. appraisals) elicit emotions. We propose that positive emotions about 204 
potential contests indicate that fitness benefits outweigh perceived costs, activating a reward 205 
acquisition system [6,7]. This system covers (1) cognition: information gathering and 206 
decisions to enter and escalate contests; (2) drive: work invested to attack; (3) 207 
neurophysiology: dopamine and opioid activity; and (4) behaviour: threat displays and 208 
aggression. By contrast, negative emotions indicate that perceived contest costs outweigh 209 
fitness benefits, activating a punishment avoidance system. This system covers (1) cognition: 210 
information gathering and decisions to avoid and withdraw; (2) drive: work invested to 211 
escape; (3) neurophysiology: reduced serotonergic activity; and (4) behaviour: submission 212 
and retreat. 213 
From a human perspective, linking positive valence and aggressive behaviour may seem 214 
counterintuitive. Anger, for instance, feels negative [85], but causes aggression [86,87]. 215 
However, this perspective is based on our conscious experience of emotion (i.e. the feeling 216 
component). The non-feeling components indicate that anger is a reward acquisition emotion 217 
(i.e. positive valence), not a punishment avoidance emotion (i.e. negative valence [88]). 218 
Anger drives approach towards the inducing stimulus, whereas negative-valence emotions 219 




require conscious feeling – categorises anger as positively valenced. Negative-valence 221 
emotions can lead to aggressive behaviour, but only when withdrawal is not an option (e.g. 222 
cornered animals lashing out). In the present manuscript, we only consider positive-valence 223 
aggression, where the aim is resource acquisition. 224 
This review focuses on contest initiation, winning, and losing, but affective states might also 225 
govern behavioural transitions within contests, such as levels of display or escalated 226 
aggression (e.g. [78–80]). From an emotion standpoint, the transitions at either end of 227 
contests are more empirically tractable. Applying an emotional event pre-contest indicates 228 
how emotions influence initiation, for example, whereas applying an emotional event 229 
between contests indicates how emotions disrupt experience effects. Tracking emotions 230 
during contests is more challenging, as contests are ongoing emotional events. To resolve this 231 
issue, we propose startling contestants at set points during a contest [29,89]. Motivation 232 
theorists interpret faster contest resumption (i.e. shorter startle latencies) as stronger 233 
motivation to fight [33]. However, affective state influences the startle reflex [47]. In humans 234 
[90], rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) [91], and rats (Rattus norvegicus) [90], negative-235 
valence states increase startle duration and magnitude. Future researchers could use startle 236 
duration to understand how valence relates to within-contest behavioural transitions. 237 
To summarise, emotion theory correctly predicts that contest assessments cover more than 238 
RV and RHP. Animals assess the resource, opponent, and context, in relation to individual 239 
circumstances. We hope researchers investigate whether additional human appraisals 240 
influence contest dynamics in other species. For example, perhaps agency appraisals (who 241 
was responsible? what did they intend?) influence contest decision-making. Under our 242 
definition of emotion, these appraisals elicit emotional responses that reflect personal 243 
circumstances and prevailing conditions. Conceptualising cognition, drive, and 244 
neurophysiology as a unified affective state underpinning behaviour explains existing results 245 
and generates new hypotheses. 246 
4. Contest Outcome and Experience Effects 247 
Contest outcomes indicate how an individual’s RHP compares to the population’s RHP 248 
[92,93]. Assuming self-assessment, wins signal relatively high personal RHP and losses 249 
signal relatively low personal RHP. Winners, therefore, initiate, escalate, and win more 250 




(loser effects [94–96]). We conceptualise contests as emotional events, so winning induces 252 
positive-valence emotions that increase aggressive behaviour and losing induces negative-253 
valence emotions that reduce aggressive behaviour (even if actual RHP does not change). By 254 
reflecting cumulative emotional outcomes, winner and loser effects represent longer-term 255 
moods (Figure 3). 256 
Figure 3. Cumulative emotional valence determines mood [11] (manifested in aggression). 257 
Considering only integral (objectively contest-relevant) influences, white dots are wins and 258 
black dots are losses. Considering both integral and incidental (objectively contest-259 
irrelevant) influences, white dots are rewards and black dots are punishments. 260 
Both emotions and moods cause cognitive changes, such as judgement and decision-making 261 
biases [97]. People in positive affective states interpret ambiguous stimuli more optimistically 262 
than people in negative affective states [81], whereas pessimistic judgements characterise 263 
depression and anxiety [81,98–100]. Animals also exhibit judgement biases. Under 264 
ambiguity, mammals, birds, fish, and insects in positive affective states have higher 265 
expectations of reward and lower expectations of punishment than animals in negative 266 
affective states [7,46,48,49,101]. Assuming reward and punishment experience predicts likely 267 
outcomes in the present, moods indicate whether ambiguous stimuli signal positive or 268 
negative outcomes, leading to judgement biases [14,49]. We, therefore, suggest that mood-269 
induced judgement bias underlies contest experience effects. Winners gain fitness-enhancing 270 
resources, so winning is positively valenced. Thus, previous winners should be relatively 271 
optimistic about unknown rewards (RV) and outcome likelihood (RHP), and correspondingly 272 
more aggressive. Losing, meanwhile, is negatively valenced, so losers should be more 273 
pessimistic and less aggressive. Indeed, perceived RHP, rather than actual RHP, influences 274 
winner and loser effects [94,95] (cf. [102]). 275 
Empirical evidence suggests that contests induce judgement biases. Researchers have trained 276 
both dominant and subordinate animals to associate one stimulus with a high-value reward 277 
(leading to shorter response latencies) and another stimulus with a low-value reward or no 278 
reward (leading to longer response latencies). When subsequently presented with untrained 279 
intermediate stimuli, dominant animals respond faster and more frequently than subordinates 280 
(rats: [103]; pigs, Sus scrofa: [104]; tufted capuchins, Sapajus apella: [105]). We interpret the 281 
dominant animals’ higher reward anticipation as optimism, which may reflect wins inducing 282 




repeatedly lose contests exhibit lower reward anticipation towards ambiguous stimuli, which 284 
we interpret as pessimism. Equivalent opponent-directed behaviour – reduced likelihood of 285 
attacking an ambiguous rival – would constitute a loser effect. As judgement biases influence 286 
responses to ambiguity more than responses to predictable outcomes [7,49], we hypothesise 287 
that judgement biases impact behaviour in contests with unpredictable outcomes (where 288 
opponents have similar RHP) more than contests with predictable outcomes (where 289 
opponents’ RHP differs markedly). 290 
Experience effects also suggest that contests can be intrinsically rewarding [107]. In addition 291 
to yielding external reward, aggressive behaviour itself (and particularly winning) seems to 292 
induce positive affective states, which may inform future decisions. For example, mice (Mus 293 
musculus) learn instrumental responses to access and attack submissive opponents [108]. 294 
Responses decline for non-submissive opponents, revealing that outcome matters. Moreover, 295 
winning induces conditioned place preference in mice [109], Syrian hamsters (Mesocricetus 296 
auratus) [110], and green anoles [111]. From an affective state perspective, positive emotions 297 
reward this conditioning. Affective reinforcement might also occur within a single contest. 298 
For instance, accurate strikes [30] or appropriate assessments [112] may be rewarding. 299 
To recap, we suggest that moods, which reflect contest outcome experience, mediate 300 
expectations about unknown RV and future outcomes. Mood-induced judgement bias and 301 
affective reinforcement may underpin these experience effects. To investigate judgement 302 
bias, contest researchers could measure optimism pre- and post-contest (see [48,49]). We 303 
predict that wins induce optimism and losses induce pessimism, with state optimism 304 
producing winner effects and state pessimism producing loser effects. Exploring the role of 305 
neurotransmitters linked to reward, such as opioids, could reveal whether contests are 306 
intrinsically rewarding. 307 
5. Crossing Behavioural Contexts 308 
So far, we have considered adaptive affective states. There are clear fitness benefits to 309 
cumulative experience informing reliable assessments, but existing optimality models already 310 
predict these effects. How do emotions and moods advance our understanding? 311 
Integral affective states are objectively relevant to a cognitive process. In humans, for 312 




(cognition) to go outside (behaviour). Incidental affective states, on the other hand, influence 314 
objectively unrelated cognitive processes [38,81,113–115]. For example, people rate their 315 
overall life satisfaction higher on sunny days than rainy days [116]. Sunshine (stimulus) 316 
induces positive valence (emotion) that causes an objectively unrelated assessment 317 
(cognition) to be reported positively (behaviour). Incidental affective states, thus, distinguish 318 
optimal and affective decision-making. Optimality models only use integral information, 319 
whereas affective states incorporate incidental influences as well. 320 
Although understudied in behavioural ecology, incidental affective states influence animal 321 
cognition and behaviour. Starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) with enriched housing judge unrelated 322 
temporal stimuli more optimistically [44], whilst honeybees (Apis mellifera) shaken 323 
aversively judge unrelated olfactory stimuli more pessimistically [117]. Moreover, isolating 324 
rats improves recall of unrelated light and sound stimuli [50]. It follows that incidental 325 
information may influence contest behaviour, and that rewards and punishments in general – 326 
not wins and losses specifically – induce “winner” and “loser” effects (Figure 3). For 327 
instance, positive-valence female interactions increase aggressive behaviour in male speckled 328 
wood butterflies (Pararge aegeria) [118] and wolf spiders (Venonia coruscans) [119], 329 
whereas negative-valence predator exposure decreases aggressive behaviour in daffodil 330 
cichlids (Neolamprologus pulcher) [120]. However, a note of caution: apparently incidental 331 
influences may be functionally integral. Presence of a potential mate, for example, increases 332 
contest benefits, and predation risk increases contest costs [118–120]. We must understand a 333 
species’ ecology to determine whether cross-context variables are objectively relevant, and 334 
hence whether they are integral or incidental. We welcome new research to fill this 335 
knowledge-gap. Contest researchers could borrow affective state research methods from 336 
animal welfare science and psychopharmacology. Exposing fish to antidepressants and 337 
anxiolytics in wastewater has produced equivocal results: venlafaxine increases aggression 338 
[121], but fluoxetine reduces aggression [122]. To test whether incidental affective states 339 
influence contest behaviour, we need controlled interventions in more species. 340 
Incidental affective states not only influence contests; contests might also induce incidental 341 
affective states and influence objectively unrelated cognitive processes (see [123]). For 342 
example, rats that repeatedly lose contests develop anhedonia: reduced reward sensitivity, 343 
expressed in non-contest situations and linked to depression in humans. Giving the rats 344 




with subordinate bystanders, capuchins exposed to aggressive bystanders allocate more 346 
attention towards humans [125]. Dominant capuchins [105] and pigs [104] expect more 347 
positive outcomes from ambiguous spatial stimuli (i.e. optimism), whilst subordinate cod 348 
expect fewer positive outcomes from ambiguous spatial stimuli [106] (i.e. pessimism). 349 
Contest-induced incidental affective states may influence virtually any decision. Is brightly-350 
coloured prey toxic or a mimic? Are rustling leaves a predator or the wind? When moods bias 351 
decisions, the most encountered emotional stimuli with the longest duration and most polar 352 
valence might determine behaviour, regardless of objective relevance. It is possible that 353 
frequently winning contests, for example, may induce optimism that rare prey is edible, even 354 
if the prey is usually toxic. This example illustrates how decision-making using incidental 355 
information can negatively impact fitness. Incidental affective states may cause maladaptive 356 
behaviour [38]. 357 
Given their maladaptive potential, we suggest two reasons for incidental affective states. 358 
First, to be selected, cross-context affective states must increase fitness on average – not 359 
necessarily every time. Nettle and Bateson [14] noted that recent environment and physical 360 
condition persist across behavioural contexts. Lame animals, for instance, cannot fight, 361 
forage or flee from predators, so information from each of these contexts is integral to the 362 
others. Cross-context affective states will be selected if most are integral, even if some are 363 
incidental. In humans, various measures increase the likelihood that cross-context affective 364 
states only influence relevant cognition [114,115]. For example, people associate their 365 
affective states with concurrent cognitive processes [126]. Incidental emotional influences are 366 
also less common than incidental moods, because emotions usually have an obvious cause 367 
[114]. Animal research may reveal similar mechanisms to limit incidental affect. 368 
The second possible explanation is that incidental affective states dominate when animals 369 
lack reliable information, or when acquisition and storage costs outweigh the benefits [59]. 370 
This is why humans evaluating ambiguous stimuli (e.g. brand names without product details) 371 
rely on incidental affective states [127]. In animal contests, a fight indicates rival RHP most 372 
accurately, but entails substantial investment and potential injury [64,67]. Assessments in 373 
other contexts carry their own cost/accuracy trade-offs. Bystander effects avoid fight costs 374 
and reflect individual RHP, but they require individual discrimination and recall [32]. Winner 375 
and loser effects are less cognitively demanding, but based on previous opponents’ RHP. 376 




We hypothesise that mood does not even distinguish between behavioural contexts, further 378 
reducing both cognitive requirements and accuracy. Incidental affective states may, therefore, 379 
influence decisions when contestants have less reliable information or high information-380 
gathering costs (e.g. intruders). From this perspective, incidental affective states are the “best 381 
of a bad job”. 382 
In summary, integral affective states are objectively relevant and adaptive, whereas incidental 383 
affective states are objectively irrelevant and potentially maladaptive. Incidental influences 384 
may nonetheless seep in when integral information is unavailable or costly. Despite 385 
preliminary evidence, we do not yet know the extent of incidental affective states in animal 386 
decision-making. We hope that future researchers test whether objectively unrelated stimuli 387 
impact contest dynamics. Without integral influences, we predict that generic rewards 388 
increase aggression and generic punishments decrease aggression. 389 
6. Conclusion 390 
An affective states approach generates novel predictions and opens new avenues for 391 
behavioural ecology (Table 1). Both emotions and contest behaviour rely on assessments of 392 
stimuli and their personal significance; both enlist cognition, drive, and neurophysiology; and 393 
both reflect reward and punishment experience. We equate contest assessments to emotional 394 
appraisals, which determine contest decision-making and behaviour. We explain experience 395 
effects as wins inducing positive moods and losses inducing negative moods. This 396 
hypothesis, and our conception of contests as emotional episodes, predicts that manipulating 397 
affective state will modify contest behaviour. As well as integral influences, incidental 398 
affective states may impact contests, and contest-induced affective states may impact 399 
objectively unrelated behaviours. We hypothesise that high-frequency, long-lasting, polar-400 
valence events disproportionately influence animal decision-making and behaviour, even if 401 
incidental. Moreover, despite our focus on contests, emotion theory may underpin all non-402 
reflexive behaviour – from signalling to mate choice to parental care. Behavioural ecologists 403 
and fundamental ethologists study these fields separately, but affective states transcend 404 





Table 1. Major predictions and outstanding questions that arise from applying emotion 407 
theory to animal contests 408 
Funding: A.C. received a postgraduate studentship from Northern Ireland’s Department for 409 
the Economy. This paper is part of a project that has received funding from the European 410 
Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 411 
programme, Grant Number 851145. 412 
Acknowledgements: We thank Robert Elwood, an anonymous reviewer, and Innes Cuthill 413 
for their useful comments and insights on this manuscript.   414 
References 415 
1. Anderson DJ, Adolphs R. 2014 A framework for studying emotions across species. Cell 416 
157, 187–200. (doi:10.1016/j.cell.2014.03.003) 417 
2. Boissy A, Manteuffel G, Jensen MB, Moe RO, Spruijt B, Keeling LJ, Winckler C, 418 
Forkman B, Dimitrov I, Langbein J, Bakken M, Veissier I, Aubert A. 2007 Assessment of 419 
positive emotions in animals to improve their welfare. Physiology & Behavior 92, 375–420 
397. (doi:10.1016/j.physbeh.2007.02.003) 421 
3. Gygax L. 2017 Wanting, liking and welfare: The role of affective states in proximate 422 
control of behaviour in vertebrates. Ethology 123, 689–704. (doi:10.1111/eth.12655) 423 
4. Kremer L, Klein Holkenborg SEJ, Reimert I, Bolhuis JE, Webb LE. 2020 The nuts and 424 
bolts of animal emotion. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 113, 273–286. 425 
(doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.01.028) 426 
5. LeDoux J. 2012 Rethinking the Emotional Brain. Neuron 73, 653–676. 427 
(doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.02.004) 428 
6. Mendl M, Burman OHP, Paul ES. 2010 An integrative and functional framework for the 429 
study of animal emotion and mood. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 430 
Sciences 277, 2895–2904. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.0303) 431 
7. Mendl M, Paul ES. 2020 Animal affect and decision-making. Neuroscience and 432 
Biobehavioral Reviews 112, 144–163. (doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.01.025) 433 
8. Panksepp J. 2011 The basic emotional circuits of mammalian brains: Do animals have 434 
affective lives? Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 35, 1791–1804. 435 
(doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.08.003) 436 
9. Paul ES, Mendl MT. 2018 Animal emotion: Descriptive and prescriptive definitions and 437 
their implications for a comparative perspective. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 205, 438 
202–209. (doi:10.1016/j.applanim.2018.01.008) 439 
10. Paul ES, Sher S, Tamietto M, Winkielman P, Mendl MT. 2020 Towards a comparative 440 
science of emotion: Affect and consciousness in humans and animals. Neuroscience and 441 
Biobehavioral Reviews 108, 749–770. (doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.11.014) 442 
11. Webb LE, Veenhoven R, Harfeld JL, Jensen MB. 2018 What is animal happiness?. 443 




12. Carver CS. 2001 Affect and the Functional Bases of Behavior: On the Dimensional 445 
Structure of Affective Experience. Personality and Social Psychology Review 5, 345–446 
356. (doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0504_4) 447 
13. Rolls ET. 2005 Emotion Explained. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 448 
14. Nettle D, Bateson M. 2012 The evolutionary origins of mood and its disorders. Current 449 
Biology 22, 712–721. (doi:10.1016/j.cub.2012.06.020) 450 
15. Trimmer PC, Paul ES, Mendl MT, McNamara JM, Houston AI. 2013 On the evolution 451 
and optimality of mood states. Behavioral Sciences 3, 501–521. (doi:10.3390/bs3030501) 452 
16. Fraser D. 2009 Animal behaviour, animal welfare and the scientific study of affect. 453 
Applied Animal Behaviour Science 118, 108–117. (doi:10.1016/j.applanim.2009.02.020) 454 
17. Posner J, Russell JA, Peterson BS. 2005 The circumplex model of affect: An integrative 455 
approach to affective neuroscience, cognitive development, and psychopathology. 456 
Development and Psychopathology 17, 715–734. (doi:10.1017/S0954579405050340) 457 
18. Russell JA. 1980 A circumplex model of affect. Journal of Personality and Social 458 
Psychology 39, 1161–1178. (doi:10.1037/h0077714) 459 
19. Russell JA. 2003 Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion. 460 
Psychological Review 110, 145–172. (doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.1.145) 461 
20. Storbeck J, Clore GL. 2008 Affective arousal as information: How affective arousal 462 
influences judgments, learning, and memory. Social and Personality Psychology 463 
Compass 2, 1824–1843. (doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00138.x) 464 
21. Bach DR, Dayan P. 2017 Algorithms for survival: A comparative perspective on 465 
emotions. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 18, 311–319. (doi:10.1038/nrn.2017.35) 466 
22. Burgdorf J, Panksepp J. 2006 The neurobiology of positive emotions. Neuroscience and 467 
Biobehavioral Reviews 30, 173–187. (doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.06.001) 468 
23. Faustino AI, Oliveira GA, Oliveira RF. 2015 Linking appraisal to behavioral flexibility in 469 
animals: implications for stress research. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 9, 104. 470 
(doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00104) 471 
24. Briffa M, Hardy ICW. 2013 Introduction to Animal Contests. In Animal Contests (eds 472 
Hardy ICW, Briffa M.), pp. 1–4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 473 
25. Arnott G, Elwood RW. 2008 Information gathering and decision making about resource 474 
value in animal contests. Animal Behaviour 76, 529–542. 475 
(doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2008.04.019) 476 
26. Enquist M, Leimar O. 1990 The evolution of fatal fighting. Animal Behaviour 39, 1–9. 477 
(doi:10.1016/S0003-3472(05)80721-3) 478 
27. Enquist M, Leimar O. 1987 Evolution of fighting behaviour: The effect of variation in 479 
resource value. Journal of Theoretical Biology 127, 187–205. (doi:10.1016/S0022-480 
5193(87)80130-3) 481 
28. Hammerstein P, Parker GA. 1982 The asymmetric war of attrition. Journal of Theoretical 482 
Biology 96, 647–682. (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(82)90235-1) 483 
29. Arnott G, Elwood RW. 2009 Assessment of fighting ability in animal contests. Animal 484 
Behaviour 77, 991–1004. (doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.02.010) 485 
30. Briffa M, Lane SM. 2017 The role of skill in animal contests: a neglected component of 486 
fighting ability. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 284, 20171596. 487 
(doi:10.1098/rspb.2017.1596) 488 
31. Parker GA. 1974 Assessment strategy and the evolution of fighting behaviour. Journal of 489 
Theoretical Biology 47, 223–243. (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(74)90111-8) 490 
32. Elwood RW, Arnott G. 2012 Understanding how animals fight with Lloyd Morgan’s 491 




33. Moors A, Ellsworth PC, Scherer KR, Frijda NH. 2013 Appraisal theories of emotion: 493 
State of the art and future development. Emotion Review 5, 119–124. 494 
(doi:10.1177/1754073912468165) 495 
34. Scherer KR. 2001 Appraisal Considered as a Process of Multilevel Sequential Checking. 496 
In Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, research (eds Scherer, KR, Schorr 497 
A, Johnstone T), pp. 92–120. New York: Oxford University Press. 498 
35. Moors A. 2013 On the Causal Role of Appraisal in Emotion. Emotion Review 5, 132–140. 499 
(doi:10.1177/1754073912463601) 500 
36. Uusberg A, Taxer JL, Yih J, Uusberg H, Gross JJ. 2019 Reappraising reappraisal. 501 
Emotion Review 11, 267–282. (doi:10.1177/1754073919862617) 502 
37. Veissier I, Boissy A, Désiré L, Greiveldinger L. 2009 Animals’ emotions: studies in 503 
sheep using appraisal theories. Animal Welfare 18, 347–354. 504 
38. Lerner JS, Li Y, Valdesolo P, Kassam KS. 2015 Emotion and Decision Making. Annual 505 
Review of Psychology 66, 799–823. (doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115043) 506 
39. Damasio A, Carvalho GB. 2013 The nature of feelings: Evolutionary and neurobiological 507 
origins. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 14, 143–152. (doi:10.1038/nrn3403) 508 
40. Nesse RM, Ellsworth PC. 2009 Evolution, Emotions, and Emotional Disorders. American 509 
Psychologist 64, 129–139. (doi:10.1037/a0013503) 510 
41. Winkielman P, Berridge KC. 2004 Unconscious emotion. Current Directions in 511 
Psychological Science 13, 120–123. (doi:10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00288.x) 512 
42. Winkielman P, Berridge KC, Wilbarger JL. 2005 Unconscious affective reactions to 513 
masked happy versus angry faces influence consumption behavior and judgments of 514 
value. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31, 121–135. 515 
(doi:10.1177/0146167204271309) 516 
43. Birch J, Schnell AK, Clayton NS 2020. Dimensions of animal consciousness. Trends in 517 
Cognitive Sciences 24, 789–801. (doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.007) 518 
44. Matheson SM, Asher L, Bateson M. 2008. Larger, enriched cages are associated with 519 
‘optimistic’ response biases in captive European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris). Applied 520 
Animal Behaviour Science 109, 374–383. (doi:10.1016/j.applanim.2007.03.007) 521 
45. Papciak J, Popik P, Fuchs E, Rygula R. 2013 Chronic psychosocial stress makes rats 522 
more “pessimistic” in the ambiguous-cue interpretation paradigm. Behavioural Brain 523 
Research 256, 305–310. (doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2013.08.036) 524 
46. Neville V, Nakagawa S, Zidar J, Paul ES, Lagisz M, Bateson M, Løvlie H, Mendl M. 525 
2020 Pharmacological manipulations of judgement bias: A systematic review and meta-526 
analysis. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 108, 269–286. 527 
(doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.11.008) 528 
47. Crump A, Arnott G, Bethell EJ. 2018 Affect-driven attention biases as animal welfare 529 
indicators: Review and methods. Animals 8, 136 (doi:10.3390/ani8080136) 530 
48. Bethell EJ. 2015 A “How-To” Guide for Designing Judgment Bias Studies to Assess 531 
Captive Animal Welfare. Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science 18, S18–S42. 532 
(doi:10.1080/10888705.2015.1075833) 533 
49. Mendl M, Burman OHP, Parker RMA, Paul ES. 2009 Cognitive bias as an indicator of 534 
animal emotion and welfare: Emerging evidence and underlying mechanisms. Applied 535 
Animal Behaviour Science 118, 161–181. (doi:10.1016/j.applanim.2009.02.023) 536 
50. Takatsu-Coleman AL, Patti CL, Zanin KA, Zager A, Carvalho RC, Borçoi AR, ... Frussa-537 
Filho R. 2013 Short-term social isolation induces depressive-like behaviour and reinstates 538 
the retrieval of an aversive task: Mood-congruent memory in male mice?. Journal of 539 




51. Jensen MB, Pedersen LJ. 2008 Using motivation tests to assess ethological needs and 541 
preferences. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 113, 340–356. (doi: 542 
10.1016/j.applanim.2008.02.001) 543 
52. Kirkden RD, Pajor EA. 2006 Using preference, motivation and aversion tests to ask 544 
scientific questions about animals’ feelings. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 100, 29–545 
47. (doi:10.1016/j.applanim.2006.04.009) 546 
53. Maynard Smith J. 1974 The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. 547 
Journal of Theoretical Biology 47, 209–221. (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(74)90110-6) 548 
54. Mesterton-Gibbons M, Marden JH, Dugatkin LA. 1996 On wars of attrition without 549 
assessment. Journal of Theoretical Biology 181, 65–83. (doi:10.1006/jtbi.1996.0115) 550 
55. Enquist M, Leimar O. 1983 Evolution of Fighting Behaviour: Decision Rules and 551 
Assessment of Relative Strength. Journal of Theoretical Biology 102, 387–410. 552 
56. Pinto NS, Palaoro AV, Peixoto PEC. 2019 All by myself? Meta‐analysis of animal 553 
contests shows stronger support for self than for mutual assessment models. Biological 554 
Reviews 94, 12509. (doi:10.1111/brv.12509) 555 
57. Fuxjager MJ, Mast G, Becker EA, Marler CA. 2009 The “home advantage” is necessary 556 
for a full winner effect and changes in post-encounter testosterone. Hormones and 557 
Behavior 56, 214–219. (doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2009.04.009) 558 
58. Kemp DJ, Wiklund C. 2004 Residency effects in animal contests. Proceedings of the 559 
Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 271, 1707–1711. 560 
(doi:10.1098/rspb.2004.2775) 561 
59. Hobson EA. 2020 Differences in social information are critical to understanding 562 
aggressive behavior in animal dominance hierarchies. Current Opinion in Psychology 33, 563 
209–215. (doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.09.010) 564 
60. Millsopp S, Laming P. 2008 Trade-offs between feeding and shock avoidance in goldfish 565 
(Carassius auratus). Applied Animal Behaviour Science 113, 247–254. 566 
(doi:10.1016/j.applanim.2007.11.004) 567 
61. Duncan IJH, Wood-Gush DGM. 1971 Frustration and aggression in the domestic fowl. 568 
Animal Behaviour 19, 500–504. (doi:10.1016/S0003-3472(71)80104-5) 569 
62. Papini MR, Dudley RT. 1997 Consequences of surprising reward omissions. Review of 570 
General Psychology 1, 175–197. (doi:10.1037/1089-2680.1.2.175) 571 
63. Vindas MA, Folkedal O, Kristiansen TS, Stien LH, Braastad BO, Mayer I, Øverli Ø. 572 
2012 Omission of expected reward agitates Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar). Animal 573 
Cognition 15, 903–911. (doi:10.1007/s10071-012-0517-7) 574 
64. Darden SK, May MK, Boyland NK, Dabelsteen T. 2019 Territorial defense in a network: 575 
audiences only matter to male fiddler crabs primed for confrontation. Behavioral Ecology 576 
30, 336–340. (doi:10.1093/beheco/ary169) 577 
65. Miles MC, Fuxjager MJ. 2019 Social context modulates how the winner effect 578 
restructures territorial behaviour in free-living woodpeckers. Animal Behaviour 150, 209–579 
218. (doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2019.02.011) 580 
66. Montroy K, Loranger MJ, Bertram SM. 2016 Male crickets adjust their aggressive 581 
behavior when a female is present. Behavioural Processes 124, 108–114. 582 
(doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2015.11.003) 583 
67. Oliveira RF, Lopes M, Carneiro LA, Canário AVM. 2001 Watching fights raises fish 584 
hormone levels. Nature 409, 475. (doi:10.1038/35054128) 585 
68. Cabanac M. 1992 Pleasure: the common currency. Journal of Theoretical Biology 155, 586 
173–200. (doi:10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80594-6) 587 
69. Levy DJ, Glimcher PW. 2012 The root of all value: A neural common currency for 588 





70. Elwood RW, Appel M. 2009 Pain experience in hermit crabs? Animal Behaviour 77, 591 
1243–1246. (doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2009.01.028) 592 
71. Payne RJH, Pagel M. 1996 Escalation and time costs in displays of endurance. Journal of 593 
Theoretical Biology 183, 185–193. (doi:10.1006/jtbi.1996.0212) 594 
72. Payne RJH, Pagel M. 1997 Why do animals repeat displays? Animal Behaviour 54, 109–595 
119. (doi:10.1006/anbe.1996.0391) 596 
73. Payne RJH. 1998 Gradually escalating fights and displays: The cumulative assessment 597 
model. Animal Behaviour 56, 651–662. (doi:10.1006/anbe.1998.0835) 598 
74. Taylor PW, Elwood RW. 2003 The mismeasure of animal contests. Animal Behaviour 65, 599 
1195–1202. (doi:10.1006/anbe.2003.2169) 600 
75. Camerlink I, Turner SP, Farish M, Arnott G. 2017 The influence of experience on contest 601 
assessment strategies. Scientific Reports 7, 1–10. (doi:10.1038/s41598-017-15144-8) 602 
76. Chapin KJ, Enrique P, Peixoto C, Briffa M. 2019 Further mismeasures of animal 603 
contests: a new framework for assessment strategies. Behavioral Ecology 30, 1177–1185 604 
(doi:10.1093/beheco/arz081) 605 
77. Mesterton-Gibbons M, Heap SM. 2014 Variation between self- and mutual assessment in 606 
animal contests. The American Naturalist 183, 199–213. (doi:10.1086/674443) 607 
78. Garcia MJ, Paiva L, Lennox M, Sivaraman B, Wong SC, Earley RL. 2012 Assessment 608 
strategies and the effects of fighting experience on future contest performance in the 609 
green anole (Anolis carolinensis). Ethology 118, 821–834. (doi:10.1111/j.1439-610 
0310.2012.02072.x) 611 
79. Hsu Y, Lee SP, Chen MH, Yang SY, Cheng KC. 2008 Switching assessment strategy 612 
during a contest: fighting in killifish Kryptolebias marmoratus. Animal Behaviour 75, 613 
1641–1649. (doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.10.017) 614 
80. Morrell LJ, Backwell PRY, Metcalfe NB. 2005 Fighting in fiddler crabs Uca mjoebergi: 615 
What determines duration? Animal Behaviour 70, 653–662. 616 
(doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.11.014) 617 
81. Blanchette I, Richards A. 2010 The influence of affect on higher level cognition: A 618 
review of research on interpretation, judgement, decision making and reasoning. 619 
Cognition & Emotion 24, 561–595. (doi:10.1080/02699930903132496) 620 
82. Mackie DM, Worth LT. 1989 Processing Deficits and the Mediation of Positive Affect in 621 
Persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57, 27–40. (doi:10.1037/0022-622 
3514.57.1.27) 623 
83. Worth LT, Mackie DM. 1987 Cognitive mediation of positive affect in persuasion. Social 624 
Cognition 5, 76–94. (doi:10.1521/soco.1987.5.1.76) 625 
84. Hutchinson JMC, Gigerenzer G. 2005 Simple heuristics and rules of thumb: Where 626 
psychologists and behavioural biologists might meet. Behavioural Processes 69, 97–124. 627 
(doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2005.02.019) 628 
85. Harmon-Jones E, Harmon-Jones C, Amodio DM, Gable PA. 2011 Attitudes toward 629 
emotions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101, 1332. 630 
(doi:10.1037/a0024951) 631 
86. Cabral JCC, de Almeida RMM. 2019 Effects of anger on dominance-seeking and 632 
aggressive behaviors. Evolution and Human Behavior 40, 23–33. 633 
(doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.07.006) 634 
87. Veenstra L, Bushman BJ, Koole SL. 2018 The facts on the furious: a brief review of the 635 
psychology of trait anger. Current Opinion in Psychology 19, 98–103. 636 
(doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.03.014) 637 
88. Carver CS, Harmon-Jones E. 2009 Anger is an approach-related affect: evidence and 638 




89. Elwood RW, Wood KE, Gallagher MB, Dick, JTA 1998. Probing motivational state 640 
during agonistic encounters in animals. Nature 393(6680), 66–68. (doi:10.1038/29980) 641 
90.   Koch M 1999. The neurobiology of startle. Progress in Neurobiology 59(2), 107–128. 642 
(doi:10.1016/S0301-0082(98)00098-7) 643 
91.   Winslow JT, Parr LA, Davis M 2002. Acoustic startle, prepulse inhibition, and fear-644 
potentiated startle measured in rhesus monkeys. Biological Psychiatry 51(11), 859–866. 645 
(doi:10.1016/S0006-3223(02)01345-8) 646 
92. Fawcett TW, Johnstone RA. 2010 Learning your own strength: winner and loser effects 647 
should change with age and experience. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 648 
Sciences 277, 1427–1434. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2009.2088) 649 
93. Mesterton-Gibbons M. 1999 On the evolution of pure winner and loser effects: A game-650 
theoretic model. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology 61, 1151–1186. 651 
(doi:10.1006/bulm.1999.0137) 652 
94. Hsu Y, Earley RL, Wolf LL. 2006 Modulation of aggressive behaviour by fighting 653 
experience: Mechanisms and contest outcomes. Biological Reviews of the Cambridge 654 
Philosophical Society 81, 33–74. (doi:10.1017/S146479310500686X) 655 
95. Hsu Y, Lee IH, Lu CK. 2009 Prior contest information: Mechanisms underlying winner 656 
and loser effects. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 63, 1247–1257. 657 
(doi:10.1007/s00265-009-0791-9) 658 
96. Rutte C, Taborsky M, Brinkhof MWG. 2006 What sets the odds of winning and losing? 659 
Trends in Ecology and Evolution 21, 16–21. (doi:10.1016/j.tree.2005.10.014) 660 
97. Paul ES, Harding EJ, Mendl M. 2005 Measuring emotional processes in animals: The 661 
utility of a cognitive approach. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 29, 469–491. 662 
(doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.01.002) 663 
98. Everaert J, Podina IR, Koster EHW. 2017 A comprehensive meta-analysis of 664 
interpretation biases in depression. Clinical Psychology Review 58, 33–48. 665 
(doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2017.09.005) 666 
99. Hirsch CR, Meeten F, Krahé C, Reeder C. 2016 Resolving Ambiguity in Emotional 667 
Disorders: The Nature and Role of Interpretation Biases. Annual Review of Clinical 668 
Psychology 12, 281–305. (doi:10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-021815-093436) 669 
100. Stuijfzand S, Creswell C, Field AP, Pearcey S, Dodd H. 2018 Research Review: Is 670 
anxiety associated with negative interpretations of ambiguity in children and adolescents? 671 
A systematic review and meta‐analysis. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 59, 672 
1127–1142. (doi:10.1111/jcpp.12822) 673 
101. Harding EJ, Paul ES, Mendl M. 2004 Cognitive bias and affective state. Nature 427, 674 
312. (doi:10.1038/427312a) 675 
102. Kasumovic MM, Elias DO, Sivalinghem S, Mason AC, Andrade MCB. 2010 676 
Examination of prior contest experience and the retention of winner and loser effects. 677 
Behavioral Ecology 21, 404–409. (doi:10.1093/beheco/arp204) 678 
103. Barker TH, George RP, Howarth GS, Whittaker AL. 2017 Assessment of housing 679 
density, space allocation and social hierarchy of laboratory rats on behavioural measures 680 
of welfare. PLOS ONE 12. (doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0185135) 681 
104. Horback KM, Parsons TD. 2019 Judgement bias testing in group-housed gestating 682 
sows. Behavioural Processes 159, 86–92. (doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2018.12.021) 683 
105. Schino G, Massimei R, Pinzaglia M, Addessi E. 2016 Grooming, social rank and 684 
‘optimism’ in tufted capuchin monkeys: a study of judgement bias. Animal Behaviour 685 
119, 11–16. (doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.06.017) 686 
106. Rogers L, Sales E, Shamsi S, Kopf RK, Freire R. 2020 Aggressive encounters lead to 687 





107. May ME. 2011 Aggression as positive reinforcement in people with intellectual 690 
disabilities. Research in Developmental Disabilities 32, 2214–2224. 691 
(doi:10.1016/j.ridd.2011.05.029) 692 
108. Falkner AL, Grosenick L, Davidson TJ, Deisseroth K, Lin D. 2016 Hypothalamic 693 
control of male aggression-seeking behavior. Nature Neuroscience 19, 596–604. 694 
(doi:10.1038/nn.4264) 695 
109. Martínez M, Guilli~n-Salazar F, Salvador A, Simon VM. 1995 Successful Intermale 696 
Aggression and Conditioned Place Preference in Mice. Physiology & Behavior 58, 323–697 
328 (doi:10.1016/0031-9384(95)00061-M) 698 
110. Meisel RL, Joppa MA. 1994 Conditioned place preference in female hamsters 699 
following aggressive or sexual encounters. Physiology & Behavior 56, 1115–1118. 700 
(doi:10.1016/0031-9384(94)90352-2) 701 
111. Farrell WJ, Wilczynski W. 2006 Aggressive experience alters place preference in 702 
green anole lizards, Anolis carolinensis. Animal Behaviour 71, 1155–1164. 703 
(doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.10.006) 704 
112. Reichert MS, Quinn JL. 2017 Cognition in Contests: Mechanisms, Ecology, and 705 
Evolution. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 32, 773–785. 706 
(doi:10.1016/j.tree.2017.07.003) 707 
113. George JM, Dane E. 2016 Affect, emotion, and decision making. Organizational 708 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 136, 47–55. (doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.06.004) 709 
114. Västfjäll D, Slovic P, Burns WJ, Erlandsson A, Koppel L, Asutay E, Tinghög G. 2016 710 
The arithmetic of emotion: Integration of incidental and integral affect in judgments and 711 
decisions. Frontiers in Psychology 7, 325. (doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00325) 712 
115. Wyer Jr RS, Dong P, Huang X, Huang Z, Wan LC. 2019 The Effect of Incidental 713 
Emotions on Judgments and Behavior in Unrelated Situations: A Review. Journal of the 714 
Association for Consumer Research 4, 198–207. (doi:10.1086/701889) 715 
116. Schwarz N, Clore GL. 1983 Mood, misattribution, and judgements of well-being 716 
informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and Social 717 
Psychology 45, 513–523. (doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513) 718 
117. Bateson M, Desire S, Gartside SE, Wright GA. 2011 Agitated honeybees exhibit 719 
pessimistic cognitive biases. Current Biology 21, 1070–1073. 720 
(doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.05.017) 721 
118. Bergman M, Olofsson M, Wiklund C. 2010 Contest outcome in a territorial butterfly: 722 
the role of motivation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 277, 723 
3027–3033. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.0646) 724 
119. Zhang S, Ai H, Li D. 2019 Mating changes a male contestant from a loser to a winner 725 
in male–male competition in a wolf spider. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society 726 
128, 83–92. (doi:10.1093/biolinnean/blz091) 727 
120. Reddon AR, Dey CJ, Balshine S. 2019 Submissive behaviour is mediated by sex, 728 
social status, relative body size and shelter availability in a social fish. Animal Behaviour 729 
155, 131–139. (doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2019.06.026) 730 
121. Parrott JL, Metcalfe CD. 2018 Nest-defense behaviors in fathead minnows after 731 
lifecycle exposure to the antidepressant venlafaxine. Environmental Pollution 234, 223–732 
230. (doi:10.1016/j.envpol.2017.11.049) 733 
122. Perreault HA, Semsar K, Godwin J. 2003 Fluoxetine treatment decreases territorial 734 
aggression in a coral reef fish. Physiology & Behavior 79, 719–724. (doi:10.1016/S0031-735 
9384(03)00211-7) 736 
123. Niemelä PT, Santostefano F. 2015 Social carry-over effects on non-social behavioral 737 





124. Van der Harst JE, Baars AM, Spruijt BM 2005. Announced rewards counteract the 740 
impairment of anticipatory behaviour in socially stressed rats. Behavioural Brain 741 
Research 161, 183–189. 742 
125. Boggiani L, Addessi E, Schino G. 2018 Receiving aggression triggers attention bias 743 
in tufted capuchin monkeys. Animal Behaviour 146, 173–180. 744 
(doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2018.10.021) 745 
126. Clore, G. L., Wyer, R. S., Dienes, B. P. A., Gasper, K., Gohm, C., & Isbell, L. (2001). 746 
Affective feelings as feedback: Some cognitive consequences. In L. L. Martin & G. L. 747 
Clore (Eds.), Theories of Mood and Cognition: A User’s Guidebook (pp. 27–62). 748 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 749 
127. Bakamitsos GA 2006. A cue alone or a probe to think? The dual role of affect in 750 
product evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research 33, 403–412. 751 
 752 
